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Abstract: Christopher Gerteis and Timothy S. George make a case for revisit ing Japan’s
postwar history in the second decade of the twenty-first century. They argue that Japan’s
problematic responses to the triple disasters of March 2011 warrant re-evaluating the
persistent myths of failure and success associated with Japan’s “postwar” and “post-bubble”
eras.
___________________________________________
Japan’s spectacular economic growth after
1945 made it an exemplar of modern capitalism
for business leaders in the Americas, Europe,
and especially Pacific Asia, part icularly at the
height of its economic dominance in the 1980s.
Japan was frequently held up as a model for the
development of East and Southeast Asia.
Malaysia was among the first to adopt a “Look
East” policy, explicit ly reject ing the “western
model” in favor of one attributed to Japan. In
1979, the American sociologist Ezra Vogel published Japan as Number One, with the subtit le
Lessons for America. Soon, executives from the United States were visit ing their former
pupil and strategic junior partner to learn the secrets of its success, while Japanese hubris
was reflected in the bits of gold foil one could order sprinkled on sushi at exclusive
restaurants. Japan was seen - and saw itself - as the successful pioneer and model in solving
the problems of late-industrial capitalism, from urban crowding to labor-management
relat ions to pollut ion.
However, the collapse of mammoth real estate and stock market bubbles by 1991 launched
the nation on two decades of economic stagnation punctuated by episodes of fit ful growth,
deflat ion and soul searching. The hubris that drove the 1980s - that “we had all the answers”
- had collapsed. The confidence, and the certainty about national goals, slipped away in the
1990s. The bubble burst, the Cold War ended, the population aged, rural areas hemorrhaged
population and struggled to stay alive, and China’s era of spectacularly rapid economic
growth continued even longer than had Japan’s. Japan struggled to find a direct ion in what
suddenly seemed to be a new and unfamiliar version of modernity, or postmodernity. There
was much talk about the “Galapagos-ization” of Japan, a turning inward, a giving up of grand
dreams and an acceptance that Japan’s global role and importance might shrink to the point
where the nation would be ignored rather than copied by the rest of the world. It was no
surprise that one response was to remember - or imagine - a t ime when things had been
different.
And then, after 11 March 2011, the state’s ineffectual response to the triple-crises of
earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster in northeastern Japan heightened popular debate
over whether the nation was doomed to a slow decline or might yet be able to recover its
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vigor and discover a new path and new
purposes. The flurry of international attention,
including a level of media coverage on Japan not
seen since the early 1990s, again brought global
interest to bear on Japan’s economic and social
woes. Yet the content of that analysis too
often suggested that Japan’s successes are
relevant but its failures are unique. While
financial reports seemed to regularly declare
Japan “out of recession,” media discussions in
and outside Japan after March of 2011 remained
haunted by the failure to bounce back from the
devastation inflicted by one of the strongest
earthquakes in recorded human history. The
ruins of disaster provided further fodder for
dismissing Japan as irrelevant on the
international polit ical stage. Reports of Japan’s
demise since 1990 remain wildly overstated, to
the point that it  has been quite fashionable to
publicly wonder whether Japan really matters
anymore.2
This seems absurd for a country that enjoys the
highest standard of living in East Asia, sustained
by the third-largest economy in the world. Of
course Japan matters for many reasons. It was
the first non-Western nation to have a
constitut ion and to industrialize. Japan avoided
being colonized and became a colonial power
itself. It plunged into a devastating war that
killed tens of millions in East and Southeast Asia
and the Pacific and ended with Japan as the first
and only nation to suffer the horrors of nuclear
warfare. In defeat, Japan arose from the ashes
of war to become an even greater industrial
power while simultaneously establishing itself as
a vibrant, pacifist, and contentious democracy.
Its modern history continues to inspire leaders
in the developing world even as many cit izens of
those countries once occupied by Imperial
Japan remonstrate against resurgent denials of Japanese wrong-doing.
Nevertheless, dismissals of Japan’s relevance have deflected attention from the ways that
Japan’s real problems today are shared with others. Both Japan’s successes and failures hold
common cause with those of the late-stage capitalist economics of the Americas, Europe
and Pacific Asia. Japan’s achievements - posit ive and negative - since the end of the
nineteenth century remain highly relevant for policy makers, business leaders, and cit izenry
across the globe. In some respects Japan in the twenty-first century is once again leading
the way, this t ime as the first nation in Pacific Asia to struggle with the consequences of
declining industrial significance, and as the fastest-aging society in the world. Japan must
finance the welfare of a populat ion that is anticipated by 2020 to be comprised of more
septuagenarians than teenagers. And perhaps most significantly, the Japanese continue to
redefine their modern collect ive identity and their country’s place in the world, as they have
been doing for over 150 years.
These developments make it all the more important that the nation forge better relat ions
with its Asia-Pacific neighbors - a task its leaders do not seem to be taking seriously
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enough. Several of Japan’s other problems, such as the extent to which the Japanese state
will follow through on its mandate to reconstruct the quake-devastated Northeast, are also
undoubtedly crit ical. Indeed, there is reason to doubt that the Japanese government will
adequately respond given its persistent incapacity to call to heel the accident-prone nuclear
industry and the diplomatic hornet’s nest st irred up each t ime a government minister decries
the veracity of Chinese and Korean memories of the Second World War.3
It seems clear that those engaged in explaining Japan’s geopolit ical role need to move
beyond the simplist ic messages of “copy this” and “beware of that.” It is t ime to once more
rethink how we explain Japan to the wider world. Our recent edited volume, Japan since
1945: From Postwar to Post-bubble (Bloomsbury 2013), grew out of two gatherings of
scholars of postwar Japan. Unlike many pundits over the past two decades, the part icipants
in the 2009 conference “Revisit ing Postwar Japan” at Sophia University in Tokyo, and a
workshop at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies in 2010, did
not take for granted the value of studying Japan since 1945. In that volume, we focused on
four issues: civic life, the legacies of war and military occupation, the emergence of a
postindustrial economy, and the interaction of public memory with the social, polit ical, and
economic trajectories from the postwar to the post-bubble era. Our goal was to paint a
more robust portrait of Japan’s contemporary history by examining the social, cultural, and
polit ical underpinnings of Japan’s postwar and postindustrial trajectories. More broadly, our
ongoing collect ive goal is to cross the intellectual boundaries where history leaves off and
other disciplines begin, in order to put to rest popular dismissals of Japan’s relevance in the
twenty-first century world.
Civic Imaginations
As the term “postwar” suggests, the formative
narrative and material framework for Japan
today is st ill World War II. Japan’s war in Pacific
Asia from 1931 to 1945 caused the most
widespread bloodshed the region had ever
known, with a total cost in lives that may have
reached as many as 20 million people dead.4
The domestic experiences of war for many
ordinary Japanese was of death and severe
hardship, culminating with the incendiary
bombings of Tokyo and Osaka and nuclear
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the
wake of Japan’s surrender in August 1945, the
international war crimes tribunals tried, convicted, and hanged only a handful of the polit ical
and military leaders most responsible for the war, leaving many issues of war responsibility
unresolved. Yet the people and government of postwar Japan were remarkable for their
ability to convert the experiences of the wart ime era into productive, long-lived alliances
with many of Japan’s former enemies. This was one way that Japan became a model for the
world’s late industrializers.
Posit ioning themselves in the dual role of proconsul and tutor, the mostly American officials
of the Allied Occupation of Japan (1945–1952) translated their social and polit ical vision of
democracy into a constitut ional monarchy for Japan that embraced the rights of free
speech, formal gender equality and a “minimum standard of cultured living.” Yet, while the
Allied Occupation is often characterized as a liberal “New Deal” for Japan, reactionary strains
within the American polit ical system, in part icular the rise of anti-Communism and the onset
of the Cold War, also had tremendous repercussions for Japan. They strengthened the
hands of its more conservative polit icians and left the nation no choice but to join the
American side in a polarized world.
One persistent belief about Japan is that it  lacked a historical tradit ion of an engaged
cit izenry. This is of course a myth – generated by and believed in by many Japanese as well
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as others. However, the Meiji, Taishō, and even
the early Shōwa eras (1868–1912, 1912–1926,
and 1926–1931) witnessed considerable right-
and left-wing polit ical act ivity, some of it  quite
radical. The postwar years saw an even greater
level of civic engagement. Indeed, the postwar
era was a clear example of fract ious democratic
capitalism, even though the huge cit izens’
movements of the era are rarely recalled today.
As a result, the postwar era is largely
remembered within the narrow, sometimes
stult ifying context of the “economic miracle”
narrative. For some, this blind spot has the
ironic – and at t imes convenient – consequence
of obscuring the way that Japan can be a useful
model for societ ies that hope to enjoy both
economic growth and polit ical pluralism.
However, others see it  as obscuring the way
cit izens’ movements were coopted before they
could fundamentally transform the nation’s polit ical economy.
Japan’s two constitut ions - the Meiji constitut ion of 1890, and the current constitut ion in
effect since May 3, 1947 - were both literally handed to the Japanese people from above,
the former from the Meiji emperor and the latter from their postwar occupiers. The Allied
Occupation, the legacies of the war and the new constitut ion constituted an infrastructure
that the everyday cit izens could do litt le to change. What they could control, however, was
how they responded to them, and the meanings they assigned to these responses. In doing
so, they were writ ing new chapters in the story of Japan’s continuing redefinit ion of its
modern domestic and international identity.
The 1950s were indeed witness to great social and economic turmoil.  from the efforts by
the cit izens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end the nuclear arms race to the unionization
struggles led by coal miners demanding basic safety equipment and fair wages. – This
picture of Japanese life stands in stark contrast to the middle-class family lives portrayed
widely in television and motion picture melodramas today. Yet the 1950s nevertheless saw
the emergence of conservative one-party rule, despite the upsurge in civic organizations and
mass movements underpinned by constitut ional protections for individual rights and mass
polit ics.
By 1960, the polit ical dissatisfact ions of millions of Japanese had sparked a national
movement to rescind the postwar military treaties with the United States. These
dissatisfact ions grew by the end of the decade into vast national movements calling for the
end of Japanese support for the Vietnam War and the reversion of Okinawa from American
to Japanese sovereignty. The protests targeted American government policies as much as
those of the Japanese government. Not coincidentally, the United States poured resources
into protecting the Japanese government from democratic demands to expel the U.S.
bases and end Japan’s logist ical support for the war in Vietnam. Then, after these national
social movements of the 1960s were squelched by extra-parliamentary and occasionally
extrajudicial act ion, many polit ically act ive Japanese people refocused their civic engagement
onto more local concerns, such as industrial pollut ion in Minamata, social welfare policies and
resistance to state encroachment upon the rights of farmers in Narita. They were able to
force the Japanese government to make significant policy changes in these areas in order to
hold on to polit ical power.
Supporters of the antiwar clause in Japan’s constitut ion at the Global Art icle 9 Conference,
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These social movements from the late 1950s to the early 1970s defined the new outer
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boundaries of democracy in Japan, shaped not by cit izen apathy but by increasingly
impermeable inst itut ional barriers. Cit izens were deeply involved in national polit ical
movements for the first 15 years of the postwar era, but hit several roadblocks between
1960 and 1970 that demarcated what has customarily been characterized as a decline in
part icipatory democracy and the consolidation of one-party rule. Although left ist polit ical
movements exerted considerable influence on the shape of Japanese society, the center-
right leveraged its access to corporate patronage networks and American Cold War
preferences, determined to emerge as the more powerful force. The formation of the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955 marked the beginning of an era of conservative
polit ics that remained the norm apart from short breaks in LDP rule in 1993-94 and 2009-12.
These conservative rulers continued the pattern going back to Meiji of responding to
domestic challenges just in t ime and just enough to remain in power.
The opening chapters of Japan since 1945
explore the meaning of Japan’s postwar
democracy at the local level. This section
features essays exploring how Japan’s postwar
democracy translated into - or was defined by -
local practice by examining the shape of civic
engagement that developed in various local
communit ies, although all were also influenced
by the national polit ics that flowed from the
capital city. By reconstructing narratives of civic
life in Kamakura, a historically significant satellite
of Tokyo, and several townships deep in Japan’s
rural periphery, Laura Hein, Timothy George, and
Martin Dusinberre each examine from different
angles the structures of civil society and of
regional identity that emerged within the
postwar constitut ional order. Running against a
t ide of literature that depicts postwar Japan as a nation driven by an interventionist state in
league with vert ically integrated corporate systems, the essays in this section reconstruct a
more nuanced portrait of civic life in postwar Japan than those focused solely on the national
center. George and Dusinberre also explore the boundaries of the nostalgic longing for
“tradit ional” village Japan that accompanied the rise of the “furusato” (native place)
movement in the 1990s.
Legacies of War and Occupation
If anything has been proven by the endless debates about when or whether the “postwar”
has ended, it  is that Japan has never escaped the long shadow of its Asia-Pacific War. The
“postwar” was declared over many t imes, including when the Allied Occupation ended in
1952, again when the nation’s GNP regained its prewar peak in 1955, when Japan’s economy
passed that of West Germany in 1968 to become the third largest in the world after those
of the USA and the USSR, the two superpowers of the day, once again in the 1980s when
Japan was the world’s largest creditor and foreign aid donor and home to the world’s ten
largest banks, and in 1989 when the Shōwa emperor died after 63 years on the throne.
Some st ill believe the end of the postwar has not yet arrived.
Yet, there remained ever-present reminders that the war was not buried in the past.
Okinawa was occupied and administered by the United States until 1972, and large port ions
of it  remain under U.S. military control. Beginning in the 1980s and continuing since then,
former vict ims of Japan’s invasion of the Asian continent reacted in anger when textbooks in
Japan called that invasion an “advance” and Japanese polit icians denied that there had been
a Rape of Nanjing. Such discontent again appeared when Asia’s former “comfort women,”
forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese government during the war, spoke out in the
1990s to demand compensation and apology. Throughout the postwar and into the twenty-
first century, many Koreans and Chinese, along with their governments, repeatedly insisted
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that Japan had never fully apologized for its
act ions.
Even the scenes of devastation left by the
earthquake and tsunami in 2011 brought to
mind for many Japanese strong public memories
of the hard t imes that followed in the wake of
surrender in 1945, as did the current emperor’s
decision to address the Japanese people in the
immediate aftermath of the March 2011
disasters, as his father had done for the first
t ime on August 15, 1945, 66 years earlier. The
decision by the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East of 1946–1948 (the “Tokyo War
Crimes Trial”) to blame a small number of top
leaders - not including the emperor - for the war
had discouraged most Japanese from
considering their individual responsibility for the
nation’s act ions. Many came to think of the war
as a tragedy that had happened to them,
brought on by those above. Even more so for
later generations, the shadow of the war was
something bequeathed to them by others and
with which they simply had to live.
Even conventional periodizations of Japanese
history, which tend to focus on decisive breaks in 1868, 1945, and 1952, can obscure as
much as they illuminate. David Obermiller shows how Okinawa experienced a much longer and
very different sort of occupation than the one that ended for the rest of the nation (except
the Ogasawara Islands) in 1952, and how attention to Okinawa complicates questions of
national and regional identity. The ethnographic emphasis in American views of and policies
toward Okinawa had a decidedly colonial flavor. So too did American attempts to shape the
ways Okinawans defined themselves and remembered their past, affect ing local, mainland
Japanese, and global views of the region. Similarly, Katarzyna Cwiertka describes the
continuity in food shortages and distribution systems across the great divide of defeat in
August 1945. By focusing on patterns of food distribution and consumption, she shows that
actual practices did not always change in the wake of changes in rulers, laws, and policies. In
the early years after the war cit izens and occupiers alike found wartime inst itut ions useful,
albeit for new goals. The new Labor Law granted workers the basic rights denied them by
the wartime state, even though it was a re-crafted version of laws and regulat ions drafted
by mid-level bureaucrats during the war. Inst itut ions for collect ively sett ling workplace
grievances developed by the wartime state enabled the rapid emergence of a militant and
strike-ready labor movement. Furthermore, neighborhood associat ions used to mobilize
women for Civil Defense during the war became grassroots mechanisms for campaigns by
women seeking to influence national and local polit ical issues.  
In the postwar period, Japanese were no longer subjects but cit izens with a much greater
space for polit ical act ivism. Even marginalized groups could, in theory, choose between
attempting to win seats at the tables of power to make policies, or simply attempting to
win recognit ion and compensation from “those above” (okami) in other ways. The nurses
described by Sally Hastings chose the former path, organizing and elect ing representatives
to the National Diet. She shows us the complicated interconnectedness of work, gender and
occupational polit ics, which involved not just female nurses rebalancing their power vis-à-vis
male doctors and polit icians, but also contestations between nurses and midwives over
notions of female professionalizat ion. Tetsuya Fujiwara shows how the largest group of
disabled veterans chose to demand formal recognit ion of their social and economic status
as patriots who sacrificed more than the majority, but in doing so also had to contend with
some of their own, the “white gown” beggars – disabled, demobilized men begging for alms
along the streets of Japan’s bombed-out cit ies – who threatened to undermine attempts by
their better-situated disabled brothers to avoid social and economic marginalizat ion.
State Policy for a Late-Capitalist Society
In his t it le for a controversial book, journalist and oft-quoted “Japan expert” Karel van
Wolferen characterized the essence of Japan’s rise to global prominence as The Enigma of
Japanese Power. He was referring to economic rather than military power. Writ ing at the
height of Japan’s economic success in 1989, van Wolferen attempted to explain how Japan
came to be the second largest economy in the world. This postwar “economic miracle” is
indeed an important subject for historical study and the Japanese “success story” has been
both envied and resented throughout the world. Japan’s rapid rise to global economic
prominence was by far the most famous of all its postwar accomplishments, yet many
scholars and pundits have, since the burst ing of the economic bubble in the early 1990s,
simply distanced themselves from their own earlier praise for Japan’s accomplishments and
aimed harsh crit icism at the state’s failure to effect economic recovery since then. They fail
to explain why things changed or whether the problems today are the result of act ions
taken earlier. There is, of course, an important back story to this narrative, one that was
neglected during the decades of economic growth.
Pundits and scholars often assert that national economic policy was the secret of Japan’s
postwar economic success, part icularly Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato’s 1960 income-doubling
policy. Less often did they emphasize the extent to which that policy was a cooptive
response to the strong showing by labor in the social protest movements of the 1950s.
Unprecedented economic growth enabled managers to refrain from mass layoffs even when
individual firms were losing money. Their companies demanded an ever greater commitment
of cheerful labor from workers in return, in a grand bargain that rested on full (male)
employment. Indeed, Japan’s unemployment rate remained well below 3 percent until the
late 1980s.
The rapid economic growth from the 1950s to the early 1970s dramatically increased the
standard of living of most Japanese households. By the end of the 1960s, the three Cs -
car, “cooler” (air condit ioner), and color television - were the longed-for icons of Japan’s new
material wealth. By the mid-1970s, most blue- and white-collar families had, or would soon
have, cars, color TVs, and air condit ioners. And by then, the majority of Japanese considered
themselves to be middle class. By the height of the economic boom of the 1980s, middle-
class affluence took on a level of mass opulence unparalleled in modern history. But even at
the height of the bubble years of the 1980s, it  was becoming clear that Japanese affluence
was built  on unsustainable social, economic, and environmental models. Nor did everyone
delight in the frenetic pace at which many Japanese sought to consume the trappings of
extravagances theretofore unaffordable, of which Gucci and Luis Vuitton handbags were
emblematic.
The economic bubble burst in 1991. Housing prices plummeted and suicide rates
skyrocketed. Along with the increasingly bleak economic outlook came cultural and social
issues that included the re-emergence of teenage prostitut ion (enjo kōsai, or compensated
dating), along with increasing rates of unemployment and homelessness, all of which had
been ubiquitous in prewar and Occupation-era Japan. Japan’s long nineties, also known as the
lost decade, stretched well into the twenty-first century. In 2002, the official national
unemployment rate exceeded 5 percent for the first t ime since the early 1950s. When
disaggregated, the data revealed a more troubling concern: the average unemployment rate
for persons aged 15-24 was double that for the overall populat ion. All through the decade
preceding the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake, aggregate wages continued to decline, the rat io of
part-t ime temporary to full-t ime regular workers rose, and the prospects for young adults
remained grim, because the employment system favored those who already had jobs.
Many Japanese wondered if the system that had brought so much success was breaking
A homeless camp in the shadow of
Tokyo’s city hall, ©Timothy S.
George
down, or perhaps was no longer appropriate for
a post-Cold War, post-high growth era in which
Japan no longer had clear models from which to
learn. Were the system and the bureaucrats,
polit icians, and business leaders who ran it
incapable of adapting to a changed world?
Young people, in part icular, feared that the
system and the social bargains that had enabled
it were now closing off rather than creating
opportunit ies for them. Crit ics blamed the state
for having failed to develop either viable welfare
strategies for the aging population or adequate
employment for the nation’s youth, but at the
same t ime, numerous pundits and polit icians
insisted that it  was the filial duty of these “lazy”
young people to buckle down and work harder.
Three of our authors focus direct ly on the ways
that state policy init iat ives toward industry,
fisheries, and finance effected considerable
changes to the relat ionship between the
postwar state and producers, not always for
the better. Essays by Lonny Carlile, Bruce
Aronson and Satsuki Takahashi reconstruct
policy init iat ives of the postwar and post-bubble
eras to examine how the state has addressed
some of Japan’s most pressing policy problems.
Carlile and Aronson focus specifically on policies
centered in Tokyo that, with varying degrees of
success, attempted to address the
interconnected milieu of pressing urban
economic and social problems. Looking to rural
Japan, Takahashi paints a portrait of fisheries
policies that illustrates quite plainly the
persistence of Japan’s historical rural/urban
divide. All three essays suggest that the
precedents of bubble-era policies continue to
shape the relat ionship between state and
society in the wake of the 2011 Tōhoku
Earthquake.
Looking Out, Looking Back
The high speed growth years were culturally
transformative, although the ghost of the war was never fully banished, especially when
Japanese interacted with people beyond their national boundaries. Christ ine Yano’s essay
takes us back to a t ime when the sky was the limit, when most people believed that the
world was about to become Japan’s oyster. Showing the way into the joys of global travel,
leisure, and cosmopolitanism were Japanese stewardesses for Pan Am, who traveled abroad
even before the relaxation of currency restrict ions in 1964 allowed other Japanese to follow.
America became a different sort of model, offering glamorous employment and freedom for
young women and lessons in the consumption of leisure travel and media for a generation
who had not known the war, or who seemed to have forgotten it. Christopher Gerteis’
chapter reminds us, however, that the past was not always so easily left behind. The NYK
shipping line’s redefinit ion of itself at the moment when Japan left the twentieth century
and entered the twenty-first included new “corporate social responsibility” practices that
involved reframing public presentation of its past. Its attempt to focus only on the
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supposed glitter, cosmopolitanism, and good relat ions with Asia up through the interwar
years, and, even more improbably, to paint itself as a passive vict im of the Pacific War, only
served to demonstrate the difficulty of escaping the shadow of the war.
Hiraku Shimoda’s analysis of the Project X
television series argues that even domestically
there were dangers inherent in the nostalgia for
the golden age of Japan’s “greatest
generation,” the everymen (rarely are women
foregrounded) who sacrificed and struggled to
create the products on which growth and
affluence were built. In the “good old days” of
high growth, the Project X series asserts, when
“death from overwork” (karōshi) was not yet a
legally recognized cause of death,
inventiveness, nose-to-the-grindstone
determination, production, and consumption
gave Japan its purpose and identity.
The implicit  message of the television show was
that Japan needed to re-adopt these values, but imagined golden ages of the past can
never be recovered. The sages of old, be they the Duke of Zhou put forward as a model by
Confucius, or the inventors of Cup Noodles or the Walkman celebrated by Project X, cannot
show Japanese how to solve the unprecedented problems of our late capitalist era. Even
after the many crises that swept Japan in the wake of the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami,
some st ill seemed to think that it  would be possible to turn back the clock or simply stay
the course. Most disturbingly such true believers included not only the nuclear power
industry, but also members of both the Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Party
of Japan.
Other Japanese people responded to the disaster by striking out in new direct ions. Among
them was the richest man in Japan, Son Masayoshi, the Korean-Japanese entrepreneur and
CEO of the SoftBank mobile phone company, who pushed for a massive solar power network
to replace Japan’s dependence on nuclear power. Another was Mikitani Hiroshi, CEO of the
internet company Rakuten, who advocated a thoroughgoing internationalizat ion of Japanese
corporate culture. Whether these or other ideas could bring back Japan’s optimism, and
again make it a global model, remained to be seen.
Contextualizing the Study of Postwar Japan
Japan’s more than two decades of economic troubles look very much like an early example
of the sort of economic predicament in which almost all the advanced economies of North
America and Europe found themselves less than a decade into the twenty-first century,
suggesting that there is much to be learned from the mistakes of the first postindustrial
society. Moreover, despite everything, Japan st ill features one of the highest standards of
living in the world, reminding us that it  provides posit ive examples in crucial ways.5 In short,
far more than is acknowledged, Japan’s situation resembles that of most highly industrialized
nations of Europe and the Americas in both good and bad ways. Some of the most
important social, economic, and polit ical problems they share are high youth unemployment,
aging populations, industrial decline, financial crises, environmental degradation, and even
natural disasters. The worry by so many about whether or not Japan matters seems
motivated by a fear that the standard of living enjoyed by most Japanese since the 1960s
is about to disappear. It was created by turning Japan into the world’s industrial base but
this state of affairs is now over. The Japanese experience of de-industrializat ion, shared with
other countries with high standards of living, is taken by many to indicate that the inevitable
result is the end of affluence for all of us. Japan is now an exemplar of how postindustrial
societ ies cope.
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Alas, Japan has not coped well with its recent crisis. The handling of the disasters of March
2011 was deeply shocking specifically because
it was bungled so badly despite the fact that
Japan has one of the world’s best-educated
populations and is a functional democracy, and
both the national government and private
companies can mobilize vast economic
resources. Yet none of these significant
strengths either prevented the disaster or led
to an adequate response. While Japan’s
response to March 2011 perhaps topped that
of the American government in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina, it  seemed reasonable to
expect that a nation built  upon a web of
earthquake faults would have been better
prepared for the disasters that befell the
Fukushima nuclear power plant and beyond.
Fukushima destroyed the image of Japan as technologically capable when it needs to be,
both at home and abroad.
The recent Tokyo gubernatorial elect ion raises doubts about the meaningfulness of polit ical
change in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear disaster. In February 2014 pro-nuclear
candidate Masuzoe Yōichi won the governorship of Tokyo over a field of candidates, including
a former prime minister who opposed restoring the nation’s reliance on nuclear power.
Perhaps even more disconcert ing are Masuzoe’s public views that women are unsuitable for
government leadership roles, which further underscores the extent to which he is another of
the "old boys" who just doesn't get it . Yet, the Tokyo Olympics in 2020 could st ill provide
Japan’s polit ical elites with the opportunity to demonstrate a vision for the future, as did
their predecessors in 1964 when the Olympic Games were used to demonstrate to the
world that Japan had reformed, recovered, rebuilt, and rejoined the club of industrialized
nations. It remains doubtful, however, that the Japanese will achieve by 2020 as broad a
consensus on national goals as was perceived in 1964.
The triple disasters of March 2011 have been described as a break with the past. The
contributors to Japan since 1945 do not attempt to predict how those disasters will change
Japan or the ways its history is already being told. But we are certain that, whatever
direct ions Japanese take now - and they will most certainly not all take the same direct ion -
they will be building on their pasts, part icularly their experiences, accomplishments, and
failures, as all societ ies always do.
These new approaches encourage all of us to
take fresh looks at how the Japanese – and
outsiders - have understood their postwar
paths. There are no simple answers to the
question of when or whether the postwar period
has ended, or what the decisive turning points
since 1945 have been. But these questions
matter because Japan’s future, built  on the
precedents of its past, will st ill have much to
teach us, good and bad, about life in the
twenty-first century. The proof is in the
pudding, or rather how we approach the
pudding: by attacking difficult questions from a
mult iplicity of angles, this new wave of scholars
may even contribute to the debates – st ill in
their infancy - about whether the disasters of
11 March 2011 constituted a decisive turning
point in postwar Japanese and global history.
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